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We study ￿nancial markets in which both rational and overcon￿dent agents coexist and
make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrele-
vance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogenously) decides to become
informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a conse-
quence the overcon￿dence bias does not a⁄ect informational e¢ ciency, price volatility, ra-
tional traders￿expected pro￿ts or their welfare. Intuitively, as overcon￿dence goes up, so
does price informativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition
activities, e⁄ectively undoing the standard e⁄ect of more aggressive trading by the overcon-
￿dent. The main intuition of the paper, if not the irrelevance result, is shown to be robust
to di⁄erent model speci￿cations.
JEL Classi￿cation: D80, G10.
Keywords: partially revealing equilibria, overcon￿dence, rational expectations, information
acquisition, price informativeness.1 Introduction
Bounded rationality of economic agents participating in ﬁnancial markets has been a subject of
intense scrutiny in the last decade (see, for example, Thaler (1992), Thaler (1993), and Shleifer
(2000)). One such well-documented behavioral pattern is investor overconﬁdence.1 Our paper
contributes to the emerging literature on the eﬀects of behavioral biases in ﬁnancial markets
by studying the reaction of rational agents to the degree of overconﬁdence of a set of irrational
traders. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that simultaneously adopts
two important features of real ﬁnancial markets: 1) coexistence of rational and overconﬁdent
traders, and 2) endogenous information acquisition by agents.2 In particular, we extend the
existing literature by analyzing the impact that the presence of heterogenous (i.e. rational and
overconﬁdent) traders has on informational eﬃciency of prices, willingness of agents to acquire
information, market liquidity, and performance and welfare of rational (and overconﬁdent)
agents.
Most of the existing models with overconﬁdence assume exogenous distribution of infor-
mation among the economic agents. Such simpliﬁcation is not innocuous: since traders’ over-
conﬁdence impacts the market precisely through the incorrect interpretation of their private
signals on the fundamental value of the traded asset, the eﬀects of overconﬁdence in the econ-
omy may crucially depend on the distribution of information among the agents. It seems
natural, therefore, not to specify a priori the information that diﬀerent agents possess, but to
instead allow it to arise endogenously. We ﬁrst show that overconﬁdence will reduce rational
agents’ incentives to gather information within the standard competitive rational expectations
paradigm (Hellwig, 1980). In this setup we show that a simple condition on the primitives of
the model exists under which overconﬁdence has no price impact, and as a consequence has no
impact on informational eﬃciency, price volatility, as well as welfare and expected proﬁts of
rational agents. None of these properties are aﬀected by the presence of overconﬁdent traders
(and coincide with the values in the purely rational economy) if the degree of overconﬁdence
in the economy is below a certain threshold.
To gain intuition for this result we ﬁrst recall that overconﬁdent traders, by overestimating
the precision of their signal, trade more aggressively on their private signals than rational
traders. In doing so, more information is revealed by the price. Rational agents react to such
anticipated behavior of the overconﬁdent by scaling down their own demand for information,
1For an excellent review on psychological literature on overconﬁdence see Odean (1998) and references therein.
For empirical evidence on overconﬁdence in ﬁnancial markets see Barber and Odean (2001), Glaser and Weber
(2003), and Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2003), among many others.
2DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1991),
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Bernardo and Welch (2001), among others, demonstrate that irrational traders
may have long-term viability and can coexist with rational traders. For an opposite result, where behavioral
agents are driven out of the market, see Sandroni (2005).
1aiming to neutralize the negative externality imposed by overconﬁdence on the rational agents’
expected proﬁts and welfare. This “reaction” can be observed only when rational traders are
free to decide whether or not to become informed. Thus, endogeneity of information acquisition
is crucial for this result to hold.
Nevertheless, investors heterogeneity does inﬂuence other properties of the equilibrium.
The presence of overconﬁdence leads to a decrease in the overall informed population as opposed
to an increase (as argued elsewhere in the literature). Moreover, overconﬁdent traders earn
higher expected proﬁts than rational traders but achieve a worse risk return trade-oﬀ, providing
a new testable implication. Finally, an economy with overconﬁdent agents will always exhibit
a higher trading volume than if all agents were rational, a result well established theoretically
as well as empirically (see Barber and Odean, 2001, for example).
Within the class of competitive models, the irrelevance result for informational eﬃciency is
shown to be robust to diﬀerent assumptions regarding the information gathering technology:
when agents can choose the precision of the signal they purchase (as in Verrecchia, 1982), and
when the error term in the private signal is perfectly correlated among agents (as in Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1980). We further show that the main intuition from the paper, that rational
agents will cut down information acquisition activities the more overconﬁdent agents there
are in the market, is robust to the competitive assumption. In particular, we extend the
Kyle (1985) framework to accommodate for rational and overconﬁdent agents. Within this
framework, but with exogenous information structure, Odean (1998) and Benos (1998) show
that overconﬁdence increases price informativeness and liquidity. We show that if information
acquisition activities are endogenous this may no longer be the case - a result with a similar
ﬂavor to the irrelevance proposition discussed above.3 Our analysis therefore suggests that the
eﬀects of overconﬁdence are more subtle than what the literature portraits.
Several recent theoretical studies focus on the eﬀects of overconﬁdence on key features of
ﬁnancial markets, as well as on the performance of overconﬁdent traders.4 Kyle and Wang
(1997), Odean (1998) and Benos (1998) consider models with informed insiders and noise
traders submitting market orders and ﬁnd that overconﬁdence leads to an increase in trading
volume, market depth and price informativeness. Both Kyle and Wang (1997) and Benos
(1998) allow for rational agents in their models, but information acquisition decisions are
ﬁxed in both models.5 Odean (1998), heuristically, argues that the introduction of rational
3In non-competitive models it is virtually impossible to get the irrelevance result that we uncover in the
competitive framework due to the discreteness of strategic models.
4See Caball´ e and S` akovics (2003), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (2001), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) for some recent work.
5In Model III, Odean (1998) allows traders can decide to purchase a single piece of costly information. The
author ﬁnds that in an economy with only overconﬁdent traders, a greater degree of overconﬁdence leads to a
larger fraction of traders that would decide to become informed in equilibrium. In contrast to our paper, Odean
(1998) does not model rational traders.
2traders to his model “would mitigate but not eliminate the eﬀects of overconﬁdent traders”(see
Odean, 1998, Model I). Rubinstein (2001) summarizes the eﬀects of overconﬁdence by stating
that “[overconﬁdence] does create a positive externality for passive investors who now ﬁnd
that prices embed more information and markets are deeper than they should be.” We show
that precisely due to this externality, rational agents will reduce their information gathering
activities, and that, indeed, this can eliminate the standard positive eﬀect of overconﬁdence
on price informativeness.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a competitive model with endogenous
information acquisition. The irrelevance result is developed in detail in section 3. Section 4
considers various extensions, where we argue that the results discussed in the paper are robust
to the types of ﬁnancial market model we consider in the main body of the paper. Section 5
concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
The basic model in this paper extends the standard one period rational expectations model
with endogenous information acquisition (see Hellwig (1980) and Verrecchia (1982)) to the
setting in which overconﬁdent (irrational) economic agents coexist with rational ones. In
particular, we assume that a measure mo ∈ (0,1) of the trader population is of the type o
(overconﬁdent), while the measure mr = 1 − mo is of the type r (rational). All traders in the
economy have CARA preferences with risk aversion parameter τ, i.e. their utility function,
deﬁned over the terminal wealth, is u(Wi) = −e−τWi. There are two assets in the economy:
a riskless asset (the numeraire) in perfectly elastic supply (its gross return is, without loss of
generality, normalized to 1), and a risky asset with payoﬀ X and random supply Z. Without
loss of generality we normalize initial wealth to zero. Letting θi denote the number of units of
the risky asset bought by agent i, and letting Px denote its price, we have that the ﬁnal wealth
of a trader i is given by Wi = θi(X − Px).
Each trader can decide to purchase a noisy signal about the payoﬀ of the risky asset,
which we will denote by Yi = X + i, at a cost c > 0. Therefore, the information set of
uninformed trader i, which we denote by Fi, consists of the risky asset price Px, while for the
informed the information set contains, also, the signal. Formally, we will denote an informed
agent’s information set by FI (the σ-algebra generated by (Yi,Px)) and an uninformed agent’s
information set by FU (the σ-algebra corresponding to the risky asset price Px). All random
variables X, Z and i are independent Gaussian random variables, deﬁned on a probability




normalize the payoﬀ of the risky asset X so that σ2
x = 1.
3In the basic setup, the only diﬀerence between the two types of traders is that type o
incorrectly believe that the variance of the signal σ2
 is equal to b−1
 σ2
, where b > 1. Thus,
traders of type o overestimate the precision of the signal, and higher values of b are associated
with higher degrees of overconﬁdence. In contrast, traders of type r correctly estimate the
precision of the signal (for such traders b = 1). Type j = o,r expectations are denoted as
Ej. Here, agents of type r compute the expectations vis-a-vis the true measure (we denote Er
as E for brevity), while the agents of the type o, those with a behavioral bias, compute their
expectations, denoted by Eo, using the probability measure that underestimates the variance
of the signal (i.e. that uses b−1
 σ2
 instead of σ2
).6
Every trader in the economy is a price-taker and knows the structure of the market. In
particular, each type j = o,r knows that the other type has diﬀerent beliefs about the precision
of the signal.7 The timing in the model is as follows. For each type j = o,r, a fraction λj of
the respective population decides to acquire a signal. Once that decision is made, each trader
submits the demand schedule for the risky asset conditional on her information set (FI or
FU). The price is set to clear the market. Finally, the fundamental value of the risky asset is
revealed and the endowments consumed.
The next deﬁnition is standard.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium in the economy is deﬁned by a set of trading strategies θi and a
price function Px : Ω → R such that:
1. Each agent i of type j chooses her trading strategy so as to maximize her expected utility




2. The market clears:
moΘo + mrΘr = Z; (2)
where Θj = 1
mj
R mj
0 θidi is the per capita (average) trade by the type j agents (j = o,r).
The setup thus far closely parallels Diamond (1985), which is a special variation of the
6We treat the overconﬁdence bias of agents as exogeneous. In principle, if the overconﬁdent could participate
in multiple trading rounds they could update their estimate of the precision of the signal by observing past
performance. In this case rational learning could eliminate their bias. See Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) for a
discussion of this point; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) for
models in which agents learn about their own abilities; and Z´ abon´ ıc (2004) for a rational model in which a bias
in self-assessment arises endogenously.
7In equilibrium, traders properly deduce the fraction of the population of each trader type that, in equilib-
rium, becomes informed. This is consistent with the bulk of the literature in rational expectations models (see
Squintani, 2006, and the references therein).
4model discussed in Verrecchia (1982).8 For expositional simplicity we introduce two basic
assumptions regarding the information technology.
Deﬁnition 2 We call an information technology non-trivial if C(τ)−1b > σ2
, where C(τ) ≡
e2cτ − 1.
Deﬁnition 3 We say that the information technology satisﬁes the no free lunch condition if











Deﬁnition 2 requires that the information technology has a suﬃciently high price-to-quality
ratio so that some traders ﬁnd it optimal to invest in information acquisition activities. If
the condition did not hold no agent would ever become informed in equilibrium. Deﬁnition
3 plays the opposite role. In particular, when Λ∗ ≥ 1 the equilibrium at the information
acquisition stage will be such that all agents, rational and overconﬁdent, ﬁnd it optimal to
acquire information. The label “free-lunch” comes from a slightly diﬀerent interpretation of
the source of information. In particular, consider a model where a seller of information charges
some price c for the signal (see Admati and Pﬂeiderer, 1986). From the deﬁnition of the
equilibrium in the next section it will become clear that such seller of information will never
choose c that would violate Λ∗ ≤ 1.9 The variable Λ∗ will play a crucial role in the discussion
that follows. In essence, the equilibrium in the model will depend crucially on whether the
constant Λ∗ is positive or not. We further discuss the role of these assumptions on the model’s
primitives in the next section.
3 Equilibrium prices
This section solves for the competitive equilibrium with information acquisition, and derives
main results of the paper including the irrelevance result. Throughtout this section, we assume
that the information technology is non-trivial and does not allow free lunch.
8The main diﬀerence from those models is that we relax their assumption that there are only rational agents
in the economy. In section 4.1 we further argue that the reduced-form model of Diamond (1985) is isomorphic
to the model of Verrecchia (1982) for an open set of the model’s primitives.
9Indeed, it can be seen that charging c such that Λ
∗ > 1 would be strictly dominated by charging ˆ c such
that Λ
∗ = 1. Thus, such seller of information would be “leaving money on the table,” and Deﬁnition 3 rues out
this case.
53.1 The competitive equilibrium with information acquisition
As is customary in models with endogenous information acquisition, the model is solved in
two stages: we ﬁrst determine the equilibrium asset price function by taking λj as exogenously
ﬁxed; then we go back to the information acquisition stage and ﬁnd the equilibrium values for
λj, thus completing the speciﬁcation of equilibrium.
Lemma 1 For given values of λj ≥ 0, the competitive equilibrium price Px is given by the





















The informational content of price, or simply market eﬃciency, is measured by the con-
ditional variance of the fundamental asset value given the market price. From Lemma 1 it









The smaller the conditional variance (6), the more information is revealed by the price
in equilibrium. Since the information revealed by the price monotonically increases in γ,
comparative statics of γ encapsulate everything we need to know about the dependence of (6)









From (7) it follows that, when λo is exogenous and positive, an increase in the intensity of
overconﬁdence b raises the amount of information revealed by the price. The intuition for this
result is the same as in Odean (1998), namely, the more overconﬁdent traders are, the more
aggressively they trade on their information, which makes the price more informative.
The next Lemma characterizes the equilibrium with endogenous information acquisition.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium with information acquisition belongs to one of the following two
classes:
6(a) If the parameters of the model are such that Λ∗ > 0, a fraction (possibly all) of the
rational agents and all overconﬁdent agents become informed: in equilibrium λ∗
o = 1 and
λ∗
r = Λ∗.
(b) If the parameters of the model are such that Λ∗ ≤ 0, a fraction (possibly all) of the
overconﬁdent traders becomes informed and no rational trader becomes informed: in
equilibrium λ∗







 (C(τ)−1 − kσ2
) (8)
Lemma 2 shows that depending on the values of the primitives that characterize the econ-
omy, diﬀerent types of equilibria may endogenously arise: traders who decide to acquire the
signal and become informed can be either only a fraction of overconﬁdent traders, all over-
conﬁdent but no rational traders, all overconﬁdent and a fraction of rational traders, or all
traders in the economy. The relevant property of the equilibrium is that rational traders be-
come informed only if all overconﬁdent traders are informed.10 This result is intuitive since
overconﬁdent overestimate the precision of the signal, and therefore it cannot be that some
rational trader decides to become informed and an overconﬁdent does not.11
Fixing other parameter values, region Λ∗ > 0 arises when: (i) degree of overconﬁdence
mob is suﬃciently small; (ii) information acquisition costs c are suﬃciently low and/or the
variability of the aggregate supply shock σz is large; (iii) values of the risk-aversion τ and signal
precision σ2
 are intermediate. The ﬁrst two conditions are rather intuitive: if there are many
overconﬁdent agents, or their bias is too high, they will crowd out the rational agents, and we
are back to the setting where the overconﬁdent are the marginal buyers of information. If the
cost is low or the noise large, traders ﬁnd information acquisition activities more attractive,
eventually making the rational traders (marginal) buyers of information. The third result
comes from the dual role that those two parameters, risk-aversion and signal precision, play
in this type of competitive models. On one hand they aﬀect the value of becoming informed:
more risk-tolerant agents are willing to pay more for a signal, and more precise signals are
more valuable to agents. At the same time these parameter values aﬀect the information
revealed by prices: more risk-tolerant agents, or agents with more precise signals, trade more
aggressively thereby exacerbating the negative externality of their trades. It can be shown that
10The fact that the overconﬁdent will always buy the signal before the rational agents do is independent of the
strong parametric assumptions of this paper. It follows from Blackwell’s theorem on comparisons of information
structures that overconﬁdent agents will assign a higher value to a given signal. We thank an anonymous referee
from highlighting this.
11In the existing literature with overconﬁdence and asymmetric information, it is typically argued that those
traders that do not buy the information are those that value it properly (see, for instance, Odean (1998), page
1907 and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), page 928). Lemma 2 formalizes this argument in the
class of models we study.
7this second eﬀect dominates for small values of τ and σ2
, which pushes down the fraction of
informed agents towards zero. At the same time, as both τ and σ2
 grow without bound agents
eventually have no incentives to buy information, and again we do not satisfy the Λ∗ > 0
condition.
3.2 Irrelevance result and comparative statics
In the following Proposition we state the main irrelevance result on overconﬁdence.
Proposition 1 If Λ∗ > 0 then overconﬁdence is irrelevant for the parameters of the equi-
librium price function, and as a consequence for informational eﬃciency, price volatility and
rational traders expected proﬁts and welfare. These quantities are equal to those that would
endogenously arise in a fully rational economy, i.e. the equilibrium is independent of the over-
conﬁdence parameters b and mo.
We can interpret Λ∗ = 0 as an irrelevance threshold and think of this result in the following
way. Compare two economies characterized by a common set of primitives (variances and risk
aversion): one in which mo = 0 (fully rational economy) and one in which mo > 0 , i.e.,
in which a positive measure of overconﬁdent traders interacts with rational traders. The
above Proposition states that as long as the degree of overconﬁdence in the economy, as
measured by mob, is not too large12 the two economies will have identical asset prices. While
previous studies argue that overconﬁdence is costly to society, (see, for instance, Odean, 1998),
Proposition 1 gives the conditions under which the process of competitive trading itself is a
mechanism able to prevent overconﬁdence from aﬀecting the informational eﬃciency of the
price, and the welfare and proﬁts of the rational traders. In this case overconﬁdence can be
costly only to the overconﬁdent.
This result obtains because of the reaction on the part of rational traders to the presence














The ﬁrst term, mo/τσ2
, is the standard term stemming from more aggressive trading by the
overconﬁdent agents as b increases. The second term, which measures the (negative) reaction
of the rational population to the increase in overconﬁdence, is what drives the irrelevance result.
A simple inspection of (3), and noting that λ∗
r = Λ∗, yields that γ is indeed independent of
12Note that the condition Λ





8the overconﬁdence parameter b.13 In turn, this implies that the parameters of the equilibrium
price function (see equations (4) and (5)) do not depend on overconﬁdence parameters and are
given by the same quantities as in the fully rational economy. As a consequence, the same is
true for the unconditional variance, expected utilities and the expected proﬁts of the rational
traders.
To gain some intuition on why the reaction of rational traders exactly oﬀsets overconﬁdence,
notice that when Λ∗ > 0, the rational traders are the marginal buyers of information, and the
equilibrium fraction of informed rational traders (λ∗
r) is set to equate informed and uninformed




where the two conditional variances only depend on the amount of noise of the economy σ2
z,
the precision of agents’ signals σ, and the equilibrium parameter γ. When the rational agents
are the marginal buyers of information (10) needs to hold as an equality, and therefore it
must be that dγ/db = dγ/dmo = 0, which in turn implies the reaction in λ∗
r described above.
The presence of overconﬁdence is perceived by rational traders as an “exogenous” eﬀect on
price informativeness, which in turn aﬀects the relative expected utility of informed versus
uninformed. Since in equilibrium expected utilities must be equal, and the overconﬁdence pa-
rameters (mo,b) enter into (10) only indirectly via γ, the equilibrium condition on information
acquisition requires λ∗
r to adjust in such a way that the net eﬀect on γ is identically zero.14
In contrast, a marginal change in one of the other “fundamental” primitives of the model
(σ2
z,σ2
,τ,c), does imply an adjustment in λ∗
r to equate expected utilities, but because these
parameters enter directly into (10), this adjustment will aﬀect the equilibrium price coeﬃcients.
On the other hand, as long as Λ∗ > 0 is satisﬁed, the two economies (the fully rational and
the one with overconﬁdence) will exhibit some interesting diﬀerences, described in the next
Proposition.
Proposition 2 If Λ∗ > 0 then: (i) the measure of informed traders is lower that what would
be observed in a fully rational economy; (ii) overconﬁdent traders earn higher expected proﬁts
than rational traders, although the Sharpe ratios of their portfolios are lower; and (iii) expected
trading volume is increasing in parameters of overconﬁdence.
13Similarly, diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to mo one can see that γ does not depend on mo either.
14 For the same reason, the same result can be generated in an economy with agents with two diﬀerent risk-
aversion parameters, say ¯ τ > τ. If the high risk-aversion agents are the marginal buyers of information, then
changes in the risk-aversion parameter τ will not aﬀect price informativeness. Therefore, these results can be
viewed as a precise statements under which the weak inequalities in Verrecchia (1982), in terms of the eﬀects of
risk-aversion on price informativeness, hold as equalities.
9We will discuss these three results in order. Result (i) is surprising. In fact, it goes in the
opposite direction of what previous literature ﬁnds: Odean (1998), for example, considers a
model where overconﬁdent traders can decide to acquire a single piece of information, and ﬁnds
that too many of them are willing to buy it. We ﬁnd that the measure of informed traders,
both rational and overconﬁdent, is lower than in the corresponding rational economy. This
is rather intuitive: when mo or b increases, γ remains constant, but since the overconﬁdent
reveal more of their signal than rational traders, now a smaller measure of informed is suﬃcient
to sustain a given level of γ.
Result (ii) follows by noting that the overconﬁdent take higher risks (without realizing
it) by trading more aggressively on their information, which in turn yields higher expected
proﬁts.15 Diﬀerently from an agent who is simply less risk averse, the overconﬁdent incorrectly
weights the market price in his trading strategy, which yields a portfolio with higher volatility
and a lower Sharpe ratio (with respect to a rational agent). The result that overconﬁdent
achieve a worse risk return trade-oﬀ provides a new testable implication, and is in contrast to
models in which the overconﬁdent are better oﬀ, using the true probability measure, than the
rational agents.16
Result (iii) conﬁrms the robustness of previous ﬁndings on the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on
trading volume. Namely, an increase in the degree of overconﬁdence mob enhances expected
trading volume. On one hand the trading volume of the overconﬁdent goes up, due to their
higher responsiveness to their information. The rational agents, as a group, trade less as
overconﬁdence rises: even though the trading strategies of informed and uninformed rational
agents are unchanged, the fraction of informed rational agents is decreasing in overconﬁdence,
and thereby total trading volume for the rational agents is reduced. The proposition shows
that the eﬀect on the overconﬁdent dominates the later eﬀect, and trading volume is indeed
increasing in mob. Our conclusions are consistent with the bulk of the empirical evidence on
trading volume and overconﬁdence, while at the same time showing that some properties of
asset prices may actually be independent of overconﬁdence.
15The result in the Proposition refers to the comparison between overconﬁdent and rational informed traders.
Rational uninformed trade on less precise information, and achieve lower expected proﬁts but the same expected
utility of their informed colleagues. This makes the comparison between informed and uninformed expected
proﬁts of risk averse agents uninteresting.
16See Kyle and Wang (1997) and Dubra (2004) for some examples from the literature, as well as the discussion
in section 4.3.
Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) propose an evolutionary model in which the replication of rational and overcon-
ﬁdent is assumed to be increasing in the proﬁtability (expected proﬁts) of their strategies. According to this
evolutionary mechanism, overconﬁdent always survive in the long run. In their model traders are risk averse
and assumed to be all informed. But when some traders ﬁnd it optimal not to become informed, the comparison
of expected proﬁts might not be the appropriate measure of performance (risk matters for expected utility).
Hence, the result that overconﬁdent earn higher expected proﬁts but lower Sharpe ratios could provide a new
(negative) argument for the evolutionary selection of overconﬁdent traders in ﬁnancial markets.
10Above the irrelevance threshold,17 only a fraction of overconﬁdent and no rational traders
become informed in equilibrium. Going back to the expression for γ, which measures price














Now there are two eﬀects that inﬂuence γ, the direct eﬀect through higher information
revelation by the informed (overconﬁdent) agents, plus the change in the fraction of informed
agents. It can be easily veriﬁed from (8) that the product λ∗
ob is increasing in b, therefore
increasing information revelation.18 A higher value of γ in turn implies that the impact of noise
on the equilibrium price is reduced, and so are noise traders expected losses (and therefore other
traders’ expected proﬁts and welfare). This illustrates the fact that in order to capture the
eﬀects that we described in Propositions 1 and 2 it is necessary to consider a model with
heterogeneous agents, where rational agents coexist together with overconﬁdent traders.
4 Extensions
In this section of the paper we consider several models in which we illustrate the robustness
of the previous results. We study more general information acquisition technologies, a version
of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model, and an imperfectly competitive market (as in
Kyle (1985)). We argue that the main results of the previous section, in particular the fact
that price informativeness is unaﬀected by overconﬁdence, is robust across these three rational
expectations models.
4.1 General information acquisition technologies
Consider now the following variation of the basic model. Agents can obtain signals of the type
Yi = X +i, with i ∼ N(0,1/p). In order to obtain such signals traders need to pay the price,
in units of the numeraire, equal to c(p). We assume that c(p) > 0, c0(p) > 0 and c00(p) ≥ 0,
∀ p > 0. Thus, the cost of their signal is increasing and convex in its precision. In this way
we extend the basic model to allow for more general information gathering technologies. The
overconﬁdent, as before, erroneously believe to receive signals, after paying the cost c(po), with
precision bpo for some b > 1.




18It should be noted that in general λ
∗
o may not be increasing in b. For large values of b the negative
externality imposed by the informed on price informativeness may actually make λ
∗
o decreasing in b. See the
discussion on non-monotonicity relationships in this type of REE models following Lemma 2.
11The competitive equilibrium in this variation of the model is deﬁned as in section 2. The
equilibrium in information acquisition is characterized by fractions of informed agents λ∗
r and
λ∗
o, and precision levels p∗
r and p∗
o, such that: (1) no uninformed agent would want to become
informed; (2) no informed agent would be better oﬀ by choosing other precision levels p 6= p∗,
or by becoming uninformed.19 The equilibrium in information acquisition follows Verrecchia
(1982), with the additional considerations that may arise if λ∗
r 6= 1.20

























r are deﬁned in the Appendix. The next Proposition describes the equilibrium
in such economy.
Proposition 3 When traders can choose a signal of arbitrary precision, then the fraction of
rational informed traders is given by: a) λ∗
r = Λ∗
GI if Λ∗
GI ∈ (0,1); b) λ∗
r = 1 if Λ∗
GI ≥ 1; c)
λ∗
r = 0 if Λ∗
GI ≤ 0. The irrelevance result in Proposition 1 holds if Λ∗
GI ∈ (0,1).
If the parameters of the model are such that Λ∗
GI ∈ (0,1), then an interior fraction of
rational agents becomes informed. The interpretation of Λ∗
GI as an irrelevance threshold is
similar to the basic model: for Λ∗















where the left-hand side of the above expression can be interpreted as the degree of overcon-
ﬁdence, and the term on the right as some threshold level. The intuition of the irrelevance
result goes back to the usual expression for the relative price coeﬃcients γ, which in this case







































The impact of overconﬁdence on price revelation is driven by the standard ﬁrst two terms
(more aggressive trading by the overconﬁdent plus more information acquisition on their part),
19Note that since in principle we do not exclude the case c(0) > 0 we must allow for this possibility separately
in the analysis.
20The assumptions in Verrecchia (1982) imply that equation (30) in the Appendix never binds. In our
symmetric model this means that either all agents become informed, or none does, as we show in the proof.
12plus the two other terms which measure the response by rational agents to the higher levels
of overconﬁdence. In the Appendix we show that when λ∗
r ∈ (0,1), then rational traders react
by scaling down the demand for information via the second term (response in the equilibrium
fraction of informed traders) in a way that oﬀsets the ﬁrst two terms given by the increase of
overconﬁdence, and the fourth term (response in the equilibrium precision) is equal to zero.
On the other hand, if λ∗
r = 1, then the third term is equal to zero and the oﬀsetting eﬀect
comes from the fourth term, i.e. dp∗
r/db < 0, but is smaller in magnitude than the positive
eﬀect resulting from more aggressive trading by the uninformed, and therefore overconﬁdence
will increase price informativeness.
4.2 Correlated signals
To inspect the robustness of our main result on overconﬁdence and informational eﬃciency, we
further consider the case in which every informed agent gets a signal Yi = X + i with i = ,
∀i, i.e. a competitive economy where agents get signals whose errors are perfectly correlated.
All other assumptions regarding the structure of the market are unchanged with respect to
section 2. This variation of the model is a direct extension of the model of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), and allows us to argue that independence of the signals does not drive any of
the results derive thus far.21




. Prices now transmit informa-
tion, but do not aggregate it, and therefore the noise of the signal appears in the equilibrium













and that (13) is monotonically decreasing in γ. Furthermore, as we show in the proof of





(λomob + λrmr); (14)
where λj denotes, as before, the fractions of agents that are informed. Equation (13) and (14)
immediately imply that when λj are exogenous, an increase in overconﬁdence b raises the
amount of information revealed by the price.
21One can show that the irrelevance result holds for imperfectly correlated signals, i.e. signal structures of
the form Yi = X +  + i, where  denotes a common error term, and the i’s are i.i.d., which subsumes the
model in section 2 and the one currently being discussed.

















The next Proposition characterizes the equilibrium with endogenous information acquisi-
tion of perfectly correlated signals.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium with information acquisition belongs to one of the following
two classes:
(a) If the parameters of the model are such that Λ∗
GS > 0, a fraction (possibly all) of the
rational agents and all overconﬁdent agents become informed. In particular λ∗




(b) If the parameters of the model are such that Λ∗
GS ≤ 0, a fraction (possibly all) of the
overconﬁdent traders becomes informed, but none of the rational agents, λ∗
r = 0.
If Λ∗
GS > 0 then overconﬁdence is irrelevant for informational eﬃciency, that is, γ is equal
to what would endogenously arise in a fully rational economy.
The equilibrium with endogenous information acquisition shares the same properties of the
basic model: rational traders will become informed only if all overconﬁdent are informed. The
intuition for the irrelevance result is identical to the case where signals were independent: the
rational traders, when they are the marginal buyers of information, scale back their information
acquisition activities (less of them become informed), and this exactly oﬀsets the standard eﬀect
of higher price informativeness stemming from more overconﬁdence.
This shows that the result on the irrelevance of overconﬁdence for market eﬃciency is
robust to other types of information structure in the market. It should be remarked that
other variables of interest, and in particular the price function itself, do depend on the level
of overconﬁdence b, in contrast to the case studied in section 3. This dependence goes much
along the same lines as in Odean (1998) (Model III) and will not be reported here for brevity.
4.3 An imperfectly competitive model
In order to further analyze the eﬀects of overconﬁdence in markets populated by both rational
and overconﬁdent agents we now turn to study a multi-agent version of the Kyle (1985) model.
The main departure point from the previous section is the fact that all agents are “large”, in
14the sense that their trades aﬀect prices. We recall that Odean (1998) and Benos (1998) showed
that the introduction of overconﬁdence increases market depth.22 We show below that this
result depends critically on the fact that informed agents are overconﬁdent: once we allow for
rational traders and endogenous information acquisition a higher degree of overconﬁdence can
make some rational agents drop out of the market, thereby decreasing market liquidity.
We consider a ﬁnite-agent economy, where all traders observe a signal of the form Yi =






For simplicity all signals’ errors i are assumed to be independent. There are m overconﬁdent
agents, who erroneously believe that the variance of their signal’s estimation error is actually
kσ2
, where k < 1.23 In addition to overconﬁdent agents, n rational traders exist in the
economy. These agents estimate the precision of their private signal correctly. In order to
abstract from risk-aversion eﬀects we let both overconﬁdent and rational traders be expected
proﬁts maximizers. On top of these two types of agents, there are also noise traders in the






As usual in this type of models, prices are set by a risk-neutral market maker, who is
assumed to be competitive (i.e. earns zero expected proﬁts in equilibrium). Namely, the
market maker sets prices equal to the expected value of the fundamental, conditional on total
order ﬂow. We let θi denote the trading strategy of agent i. All traders and the market maker
are assumed to know the structure of the market, in particular they rationally anticipate
the trading strategies of other types of traders, given their exogenously speciﬁed biases. The
following deﬁnition formalizes the notion of an equilibrium in this type of model.
Deﬁnition 4 An equilibrium in the economy is deﬁned by a set of trading strategies θi and a
price function Px : Ω → R such that:




πi = Ei [θi(X − Px)|Yi]; (16)
where if agent i is overconﬁdent the expectation is taken under the beliefs that i ∼
N(0,kσ2
), whereas if agent i is rational i ∼ N(0,σ2
).
2. The market maker breaks even:
Px = E[X|ω], (17)
where ω denotes the total order ﬂow, i.e. ω =
Pn+m
i=1 θi + U.
22The analysis is also similar to Kyle and Wang (1997), although the emphasis in that paper is on the
commitment beneﬁts of overconﬁdence.
23In the previous notation, b = 1/k
15The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium price and trading strategies.24
Lemma 3 The equilibrium price and trading strategies are linear in ω and Yi respectively, i.e.
price is given by Px = λω, rational agents’ trading strategies are θi = βrYi and those of the



































A necessary and suﬃcient condition for an equilibrium to exist is that (20) deﬁnes a positive
real number.25
As expected, the overconﬁdent agents trade more aggressively than the rational. This is
simply due to the fact that these agents believe their information to be more precise than
that of the rational. It should nonetheless be noted that the trading aggressiveness of the
overconﬁdent is no longer a simple function of their behavioral bias: it now depends, through
the market maker price setting, on the market wide variable η, which is itself a non-monotonic
function of the bias measure b. The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 5 If the number of informed agents m and n are exogenously ﬁxed, then market
depth is increasing in overconﬁdence.
The proposition highlights the robustness of the positive eﬀect of overconﬁdence on market
liquidity, when information is exogenously ﬁxed, reported elsewhere in the literature (Odean,
1998; Benos, 1998). Compared to a purely rational economy, ﬁnancial markets with overcon-
ﬁdent will exhibit higher market depth.
We now turn to study the incentives to acquire information by rational agents. In particular,
we ﬁx the number (and information) of the overconﬁdent, and allow a large number of rational
agents to purchase a signal of precision 1/σ2
 for a cost c. We let n∗ denote the largest n∗ such
that πr(n∗) ≥ c, i.e. n∗ denotes the largest number of rational agents such that if n∗ of them
are informed it is still proﬁtable for them to acquire information. This is the natural outcome
of a standard Nash equilibrium in information acquisition in this type of setting.
24The Lemma extends Benos (1998), who considers the extreme case in which k = 0.
25In the analysis that follows we will always assume this condition to be satisﬁed.
16The following proposition shows that the same forces that were in action in the competitive
models play a role in this version of the Kyle (1985) model for moderate levels of overconﬁdence.
Proposition 6 Given m, let n∗ be determined endogenously. For moderate levels of overcon-
ﬁdence, n∗ is weakly decreasing in overconﬁdence. As a result, market depth can decrease as a
function of overconﬁdence.
The result in Proposition 6 highlights the robustness of the main eﬀect which drives the
irrelevance result of previous sections:26 rational agents’ incentives to gather information are
reduced when overconﬁdence appears. As discussed in Benos (1998), an increase in overcon-
ﬁdence (given m and n) has two opposite eﬀects on the aggressiveness of rational traders: a
market liquidity eﬀect and a strategic substitution eﬀect. The ﬁrst one is related to the increase
in market depth, which causes rational traders be more aggressive; the second is related to the
increase in the aggressiveness of the overconﬁdent, which leads rational traders to trade less.
When overconﬁdence is not too severe the second eﬀect dominates, reducing expected trading
proﬁts of rational traders.27 This can in turn force some of them to drop out of the market
and reduce market depth.28 One can view this result in light of the beneﬁts of overconﬁdence
as a commitment device, discussed in Kyle and Wang (1997) and Benos (1998). Namely, if
there is heterogeneity with respect to commitment power, those agents that lack commitment
will have less incentives to invest in information, compared to the economy where all agents
lack this commitment power. This in turn can make the market less liquid.
5 Conclusion
This paper considers a model in which rational traders coexist with overconﬁdent ones. We
have shown that endogenizing the information acquisition decision generates new predictions on
the eﬀects of overconﬁdence on asset prices, with respect to models with exogenous information
distribution. In particular, there exist economies in which the equilibrium price corresponds
to what would endogenously arise in a rational expectations equilibrium. The rational agents
react to the presence of overconﬁdent agents by reducing their information acquisition activi-
ties, since the returns to informed trading are reduced when overconﬁdent agents trade more
aggressively and thereby reveal more of their information through prices. This reaction oﬀsets
the impact of the overconﬁdent on asset prices. On the other hand, we show that other asset
26In the ﬁnite-agent economies, such an irrelevance result is impossible to obtain, due to the discreteness of
the model.
27In particular, a suﬃcient condition for n





which is clearly satisﬁed as k → 1 or when 2σ
2
 − 1 < 0.
28Consider the following numerical example: σ
2
 = 1/5; σ
2
u = 2; c = 0.1; m = 2. One can easily verify that for
k = 0.5 the model implies n
∗ = 3 and λ
−1 ≈ 3.8, while for k = 0.4 the model implies n
∗ = 2 and λ
−1 ≈ 3.6.
17pricing variables are impacted be overconﬁdence: trading volume is higher in the presence of
overconﬁdent traders, conﬁrming empirical ﬁndings in the literature. Our results yield further
insights into the interaction of overconﬁdence, information acquisition and price revelation in
ﬁnancial markets.
18Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
By standard techniques, it is straightforward to see that the average trade by the overcon-





X + (λoqo + (1 − λo)w)Px
where w = (1/τ)
 
γ (1/d − γ)/σ2
z − 1

and qo = w − (1/τ)b/σ2
. Similarly the average trade





X + (λrqr + (1 − λr)w)Px
where qr = w − (1/τ)/σ2
 Using the market clearing condition (2) we obtain two equilibrium
conditions from which (4) and (5) follow. 
Proof of Lemma 2.
An informed overconﬁdent agent t gets ex ante expected utility29











On the other hand, an uninformed t agent (rational or overconﬁdent)30 expected utility is
given by





For each class of traders (rational or overconﬁdent), the equilibrium fraction of informed
traders is set to equate informed and uninformed expected utilities. If such equality does not
hold for any value of λ between zero and one, then the equilibrium fraction of informed traders
corresponds to the corner solution of one (zero) if the informed (uninformed) achieves higher
29The ex-ante utility expressions follow from Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1987).
30Notice that unconditional variances in (23) do not involve the random variable , hence are equal for rational
and overconﬁdent
19expected utility. From (22) and (23), it follows that a rational agent will buy information if
−var(X|Yt,Px)1/2eτc ≥ −var(X|Px)1/2. (24)
If this inequality is satisﬁed, then it must be that (21) is greater than (23), since varo(X|Yt,Px) <
var(X|Yt,Px). This in turn implies the corner solution λ∗
o = 1. Condition (24) can be expressed


















In the interior solution λ∗
r ∈ (0,1), the above inequality holds as an equality. Substituting
γ from (4), using λ∗
o = 1 and solving for λ∗
r we ﬁnd the expression in the Lemma.31
For parameter values such that Λ∗ ≤ 0, none of the rational agents would choose to be
informed,32 so λ∗
r = 0. An overconﬁdent agent will buy information if
−varo(X|Yt,Px)1/2eτc ≥ −varo(X|Px)1/2. (25)
When the above inequality binds as an equality, using γ from (4), the fact that λ∗
r = 0, writing
explicitly (25) and solving for λ∗
o gives the expression in the Lemma. When the inequality
in (25) is strict, then λ∗
o = 1. Finally, notice that Deﬁnition 2 rules out the case in which
condition (25) is violated. 
Proof of Proposition 1.
Substituting λ∗
r and λ∗



























Therefore, γ is independent of the overconﬁdence parameters (mo, b). Further note that
the price coeﬃcient d only depends on b through γ (see equation (5)). Therefore the price
function is independent of (mo, b). Price volatility (simply deﬁned as var(Px) = ˆ a2 + ˆ d2σ2
z)
and rational traders expected utilities ((22) and (23)), only depend on (mo, b) via the price
coeﬃcients. The same can be shown for rational expected proﬁts, deﬁned (net of the cost of
information) for agent i as E[θi(X − Px)]. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
31Notice that Deﬁnition 3 rules out the the case in which the inequality in (24) is strict, but it does not rule
out the limiting case in which λ
∗
r = 1.
32In particular, if Λ
∗ < 0, then condition (24) would be violated for any λr ≥ 0, implying λ
∗
r = 0.
20The measure of informed traders, moλ∗
o+mrλ∗
r, is decreasing in overconﬁdence when Λ∗ > 0,
since in this case λ∗
o = 1 and from expression (3) we have that







The above expression valued at b = 1 corresponds to the measure of informed traders in a
fully rational economy, and is decreasing in b.
For expected proﬁts, a direct computation shows that for an overconﬁdent informed agent
i’s trading strategy can be expressed as θi = bκ(Yi − Px) + wPx, with κ = 1/(τσ2
). It is
immediate that we can write the expected proﬁts of an overconﬁdent informed agent as πo ≡
E[θi(X −Px)] = κD +πu, where πu = E[wPx(X −Px)] are the expected proﬁts of uninformed
agents, and D = E[(X − Px)2].33 Setting b = 1 recovers the trading strategy and expected
proﬁts for rational informed agents. It is immediate that overconﬁdent agents earn higher
expected proﬁts than the rational traders. Furthermore, note that the variance of the proﬁts
of the overconﬁdent agents can be expressed as vo ≡ var[θi(X − Px)] = vu + b2
κ2F + 2bκG,
where G = cov[(X − Px)2,wPx(X − Px)], and F = var[(Yi − Px)(X − Px)]. Making the
dependence of πo and vo on b explicit, the statement in the proposition reduces to showing that
S(b) ≡ πo(b)/
p
vo(b) satisﬁes S(1) > S(b) for all b > 1. Some tedious but straightforward
calculations show that S(b) actually achieves a maximum at b = 1, which is suﬃcient for the
claim in the proposition.
Trading volume is measured in ex-ante terms, as the number of shares that are expected to
be traded in the market. Each trader’s expected trading volume, Ti, is given by the expectation
of the absolute value of his trading strategy, i.e. Ti = E[|θi|]. Expected trading volume is
deﬁned as V =
R
i Tidi, where the index of integration runs through all agents (overconﬁdent


















where A = w2d2σ2
z/σ2






 + var(X − Px)

. Noting that the trading
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In order to see that the above quantity is positive for all b the reader can verify (after some
33Notice that we abstract from the cost of information, which does not aﬀect any of the results that follow
34Using the fact that if x ∼ N(0,σ






21tedious calculations) that ∂V
∂b is indeed positive when evaluated at b = 1, and that ∂2V
∂b2
 > 0.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
















When maximizing (26) agents take the parameters of the price function as given. The ﬁrst-

























It is straightforward to show, as in Lemma 2, that no rational agent will become informed
unless all overconﬁdent choose to do so. As in the main body of the text we focus then on the
case where λ∗
o = 1. Equating the expected utilities of a rational informed (26) and a rational



















where γ is given by (11). Substituting (11) and (28) into (30) we get a quadratic equation for
λr, whose unique non negative solution yields λ∗
r = Λ∗
GI.
The above argument yields the equilibrium value for λ∗
r as long as Λ∗
GI ∈ (0,1). Otherwise
the equilibrium λ∗
r is characterized by corner solutions (λ∗
r = 0 if Λ∗
GI ≤ 0 and λ∗
r = 1 if
Λ∗
GI ≥ 1). Assume now that the parameters are such that Λ∗
GI ∈ (0,1) and therefore λ∗
r = Λ∗
GI.
Substituting (4.1) into (11) it is easy to see that (11) is not a direct function of b since the
ﬁrst term of (11) cancels out with the ﬁrst term in (4.1). Therefore dγ/db = 0 as long as
dpr/db = 0. The last condition can be veriﬁed by substituting (11) into (28): since γ is not
22directly a function of b then the ﬁrst-order condition for pr is not a function of b neither.
This yields the result that if λ∗
r = Λ∗
GI then dγ/db = 0.
On the other hand, now suppose that λ∗
r = 1, i.e. constraint (30) does not bind and all





















Given the assumption on the cost function, i.e. c0(p∗) > 0 and c00(p∗) ≥ 0, the fraction in
parenthesis in the above expression is less than 1. Then, it can be easily checked by substituting
(31) into (12) that in this case dγ/db > 0 . 
Proof of Proposition 4.























Substituting for the conditional expectations and variances (in particular note that for the
informed agents their signal Y is now a suﬃcient statistic for X, i.e. they do not condition
their trade on price) and using the market clearing condition Θo + Θr = Z yields (14).
The description of the equilibrium at the information acquisition stage follows as in Lemma




o yields the statements in the Proposition.































Therefore, γ is independent of the overconﬁdence parameters (mo, b). This completes the
proof. 
23Proof of Lemma 3.





i − θiλ[(n − 1)βr + mβo]E(X|Yi);
which yields the optimal trading strategies
θi =
 




Yi ≡ βrYi. (32)
Similarly for the overconﬁdent traders we have
θi =
 




Yi ≡ βoYi. (33)
Some simple manipulations of (32) and (33) yields (18) for some constant η that satisﬁes
η + nβr + mβo = λ−1. (34)
It is straightforward to see, given the standard properties of normally distributed random
variables, that E[X|ω] = λω, where
λ =
nβr + mβo






Using (35) with (34), (32) and (33) yields the expression for the equilibrium value for λ,
namely equation (19). 
Proof of Proposition 5.
If we let λ−1(k) denote the market depth as a function of the overconﬁdence bias, we have
that λ−1(1) < λ−1(k), for all k < 1.35 The result directly follows from partially diﬀerentiating
(19) with respect to k. Taking into account the condition for the existence of the equilibrium,
it is easy to verify that dλ−1/dk < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6.
It is straightforward to compute the expected trading proﬁts at equilibrium, πr = E[θi(X − Px)],
















































and that dξ/dk > 0. It follows that for dπr/dk > 0 a suﬃcient condition is 2kσ2
 > 2σ2
 − 1.
The second result follows immediately by considering small changes in the overconﬁdence
parameter when the constraint πr(n∗) ≥ c binds. 
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